

MODALISM AND MENTALISM IN MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY

CONFERENCE BOOKLET

January 29—31, 2004
The Carlsberg Academy, Copenhagen
Denmark

sponsored by

NAMICONA
Naturalised Mind / Cognisant Nature

PHIS
The Danish Research School in Philosophy, History of Ideas and History of Science

including

PRE-CONFERENCE BOOKLET, January 27—28, 2004
Roskilde University
Denmark

The Φ NEWS Bulletin, January 2004 / An imprint of Φ NEWS

Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks, Stig Andur Pedersen and Dov M. Gabbay

is published by

ΦLOG
The Danish Network for Philosophical Logic and Its Applications

Department of Philosophy and Science Studies
Roskilde University, P6
P.O. Box 260
DK4000 Roskilde, Denmark
Phone: (+45) 4674 2343 Fax: (+45) 4674 3012
Website: <http://www.phinews.ruc.dk>
Website: <http://www.philog.ruc.dk>

and

Kluwer Academic Publishers

P.O. Box 17
3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands
Website: <http://www.wkap.nl>

Edited by
Vincent F. Hendricks (Editor-in-chief, vincent@ruc.dk)
Stig Andur Pedersen (Editor-in-chief, sap@ruc.dk)
Dov M. Gabbay (Editor-in-chief, dg@dcs.kgs.ac.uk)

Managing editor: Pelle Guldborg Hansen (pgh@ruc.dk)

The ΦNEWS Bulletin, January 2004 / An imprint of ΦNEWS

Visit

<http://www.phinews.ruc.dk>

for a free subscription

Concept, L^AT_EX 2_ε-Layout, Graphics and Sleeve Designs by Vincent F. Hendricks

Typeset in L^AT_EX 2_ε

Printed by Roskilde University Press, Denmark 2004

ISSN 1602-1444

© 2004 by Vincent F. Hendricks, Stig Andur Pedersen, Dov M. Gabbay, ΦLOG and Kluwer Academic Publishers

CONFERENCE

Conference Abstract	4
Speakers and Abstracts	5
Program Committee / Organizers	9
Program	9
Lunch and Dinner Arrangements	10
Location and Transportation	11
About the Carlsberg Academy	13
Participants	14
Publication	16

PRE-CONFERENCE

Introductory Seminar	18
Lecturers and Abstracts	18
Program Committee / Organizers	20
Program	21
Lunch and Dinner Arrangements	21
Location	22
Participants	22
Accommodations	23
Travel Grants for PhD-Students	23
Φ NEWS	26

Φ NEWS • Bulletin • January 2004

Published by Φ LOG and Kluwer Academic Publishers

Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks, Stig Andur Pedersen and Dov M. Gabbay

MODALISM AND MENTALISM IN MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY

ΦNEWS

CONFERENCE
The Carlsberg Academy, Copenhagen (DK), January 29—31, 2004



<http://www.namicon.au.dk/pages/modalism.html>

Conference Abstract

Modalism in epistemology is the view that a satisfactory account of knowledge, evidence and cognate epistemic core notions involves reference to otherworldly state of affairs. Whether a certain belief for instance qualifies as knowledge is thus not something that can be settled merely on the basis of actual states of affairs. In addition, certain modal conditions – such as veracity through a specified range of possible scenarios – must be fulfilled. *Mentalism* is the view that knowledge is a *sui generis* mental state in which an epistemic agent is directly acquainted with the relevant subject matter. Knowledge ought thus not to be considered as a true belief meeting certain further actual or modal conditions which secures an appropriate link between belief and truth. In particular, there is no such highest common factor (belief) which sometimes is and sometimes is not appropriately related to truth. Knowledge and belief are two distinct mental states and the former should be understood in adverbial rather than relational terms.

The aim of the conference is to shed new light on these two dominant paradigms within contemporary epistemology and to investigate their interrelation (or lack of) when dealing with central epistemological themes such as transmission, internalism/externalism, naturalism, contextualism and scepticism. Finally, the conference will address the question where (if anywhere) modern epistemology ought to be placed on the philosophical map—in particular relative to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, decision theory and cognitive science.

The conference fee is 200,00 Danish kroner and is due to be payed in cash upon final registration—see further below.

Speakers and Abstracts

- Alvin Goldman (Rutgers, USA) / Justification, Contextualism, and the Internalism/Externalism Dispute

This is a three-part paper. The first part argues for a contextualist element in attributions of justifiedness. I claim that ‘Belief *B* is (epistemically) justified’ has a rather minimal semantic content, viz.: ‘*B* conforms with a contextually indicated system of epistemic norms’. The indicated system may be, for example, that of the speaker’s community or, alternatively, that of the believer’s community. It may be the system of a lay community or a scientific community. One should not expect to find more epistemologically substantive content than this in the *meaning* of ‘justified’. To help motivate this thesis, other sentences are adduced that also have minimal semantic implications, although additional implications may be extractable from the objects they index. The second and third parts of the paper explore systems of epistemic norms in the spirit of an approach I call ‘two-tiered reliabilism’. The reliabilist element in this approach is the thesis that, for many (most? all?) actual epistemic systems, the criterion, standard, or ground used by the community in selecting the system is truth-conduciveness, or reliability. The norms have been chosen because the community believed them to be truth-conducive. They may not actually be truth-conducive, but truth-conduciveness was the standard to which the community (tacitly) appealed. This is an empirical thesis about communities of users, not a semantic thesis. Although a fully detailed account of a community’s choice of norms would also have to provide answers to the ‘generality problem’, truth-conduciveness can be a correct partial account of a community’s choice even if no details are supplied that identify the generality principles employed. The third part of the paper considers the contents of epistemic norms. Conee and Feldman have recently argued for internalism in the sense of ‘mentalism’:

the justificatory status of a belief strongly supervenes on the believer's mental states, events, and conditions. I would reformulate this as the thesis that the contents of epistemic norms are purely mentalist. This version of internalism – mentalism at the level of norm contents – is perfectly compatible with externalism at the level of the criterion, or standard. The theory favored here, two-tiered reliabilism, invokes reliability or truth-conduciveness only at the level of the criterion. So, at least on these approaches, the presumed dispute between internalism and externalism dissolves. However, mentalism by itself has limited explanatory power. It does not explain why particular epistemic norms of a mentalist kind are chosen rather than alternative mentalist norms.

- Jaakko Hintikka (Boston, USA) / Have Philosophers Forfeited the Concept of Information?

Everybody seems to be employing the notion of information in these days, except for philosophers who have been scared away by Quine's unfortunate rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Quine notwithstanding, language itself offers some ways of defining (semantic) information in terms of admitted and excluded possibilities. But some *prima facie* possibilities admitted by a proposition may turn out to be merely apparent ones. If they are taken into account, we obtain one concept of information, called surface information, if not, another concept called depth information. Both represent, in a sense, factual information, and they can be behaviorally indistinguishable. Of the two, only surface information can be enhanced by logical inferences. Depth information cannot be assigned numerical measures purely logically, for the choice of a measure amounts to factual assumption. How should we measure surface information? By counting the weighed number of the possibilities they exclude? If we do not want to do so, it is natural to use as a measure the deductive 'labor' needed to rule out merely apparent possibilities. It is suggested that the resulting measure of surface information is essentially the same as complexity theorists' notion of information. In this way, some of the apparent paradoxes complexity theorists have flaunted turn out to be restatements of familiar truths of logical theory.

- Jonathan Kvanvig (Missouri-Columbia, USA) / Counterfactuals, Closure, and the Value of Knowledge

Knowledge is supposed to be valuable, but its value—especially its value in comparison with true belief is not easy to explain. I begin by showing how

standard conceptions of justification, on which the goal is conceived to be getting to the truth and avoiding error, with justification being the appropriate means to this goal, are not well-equipped to explain the value of knowledge over that of true belief. Once we see the central problem for such approaches, the merits of Nozickian epistemology—that approach which characterizes the difference between knowledge and true belief in terms of counterfactual connections between belief and truth—for explaining the value of knowledge can be appreciated. I argue, however, that the promise of Nozickian epistemology is deceptive, that it raises our hopes of accounting for the value of knowledge in a way that requires inadequacies in its account of the nature of knowledge.

- John Pollock (Arizona, USA) and Iris Ovid (Rutgers, USA) / Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link

It is argued that empirical data indicates that colors do not have characteristic looks that are the same for all people at all times. This creates a problem for many theories of perceptual knowledge. An examination of current computational theories of vision leads to an account of the visual image as a system of mental representations. This is used to develop an account of how epistemic cognition can produce beliefs on the basis of the visual image. The result is a sophisticated version of direct realism. For the full version of the paper refer to <http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/Perceptual-representation.pdf>

- Robert Stalnaker (MIT, USA) / The Knowledge Argument and Epistemic Possibilities

Many philosophers have noted an analogy between Frank Jackson's knowledge argument and the arguments of John Perry and others that there is a kind of essentially indexical knowledge that is irreducible to knowledge of impersonal facts about the way the world is in itself. Both argue from examples of situations in which a knower has all relevant knowledge of one kind, but still lacks knowledge of a special kind. In both cases, the special kind of knowledge is, in some sense, essentially subjective. I think the analogy helps to rebut Jackson's argument, but my main concern will be with what it shows about the way to represent information that essentially subjective or contextual, and about the role of subjective experience in determining what we know. After reviewing some responses to the knowledge argument, I will look at David Lewis's way of representing the content of indexical knowledge and belief in terms of centered possible worlds, and develop a modification of it. I will argue that this kind

of account can be used to reconcile the case of Mary in her black and white room with a materialist metaphysics, but only if we give up an intuitively attractive assumption about the role of phenomenal experience in the exclusion of epistemic possibilities.

- Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins, USA) / TBA
- Timothy Williamson (Oxford, UK) / Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement

What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it rests on bad epistemology: specifically, on an impossible ideal of unproblematically identifiable evidence. Our resistance to scepticism about judgement is not simply epistemic conservatism, for we resist it on behalf of others as well as ourselves. A reason is needed for thinking that beliefs tend to be true. Evolutionary explanations of the tendency assume what they should explain. Explanations that appeal to constraints on the determination of reference are more promising. Davidson’s truth-maximizing principle of charity is examined but rejected. An alternative principle is defended on which the nature of reference is to maximize knowledge rather than truth. It is related to an externalist conception of mind on which knowing is the central mental state. The knowledge-maximizing principle of charity explains why scenarios for scepticism about judgement do not warrant such scepticism, although it does not explain how we know in any particular case. We should face the fact that evidence is always liable to be contested in philosophy, and stop using talk of intuition to disguise this unpleasant truth from ourselves.

- Crispin Wright (St Andrews/NYU, Scotland, USA) / Transmission of Warrant, Rational Acceptability and the Serenity Prayer

TBA

Program Committee / Organizers

Program Committee

- Lars Gundersen / Aarhus University / fillg@hum.au.dk
- Vincent F. Hendricks / Roskilde University / vincent@ruc.dk

Organizers

- Lars Gundersen / Aarhus University / fillg@hum.au.dk
- Vincent F. Hendricks / Roskilde University / vincent@ruc.dk
- Pelle Guldborg Hansen / Roskilde University / pgh@ruc.dk
- Jonas Christensen / Aarhus University / namicon@au.dk

Program

Thursday, Jan. 29	
09:00 - 09:20	Registration
09:20 - 09:30	Opening
09:30 - 10:30	J. Hintikka
10:30 - 11:00	Discussion
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee
11:30 - 12:30	J. Kvanvig
12:30 - 13:00	Discussion
13:00 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:00	M. Williams
15:00 - 15:30	Discussion
15:30 - 18:00	Sight-seeing Tour

Conference Chair: Lars Gundersen / Vincent F. Hendricks

Friday, Jan. 30

09:00 - 09:30	Coffee
09:30 - 10:30	A. Goldman
10:30 - 11:00	Discussion
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee
11:30 - 12:30	R. Stalnaker
12:30 - 13:00	Discussion
13:00 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:00	J. Pollock
15:00 - 15:30	Discussion
15:30 - 16:00	Coffee
19:00 -	Conference Dinner

Conference Chair: Lars Gundersen / Vincent F. Hendricks

Saturday, Jan. 31

09:00 - 09:30	Coffee
09:30 - 10:30	C. Wright
10:30 - 11:00	Discussion
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee
11:30 - 12:30	T. Williamson
12:30 - 13:00	Discussion
13:00 - 13:10	Closing
13:10 - 14:10	Lunch

Conference Chair: Lars Gundersen / Vincent F. Hendricks

Lunch and Dinner Arrangements

On Thursday, Friday and Saturday participants may choose to order lunch through the conference organization; payments for these arrangements are due during final conference registration on Thursday, January 29. Each lunch costs 70,00 Dkr and includes a buffet and free beverages.

A conference dinner is scheduled for Friday, January 30 at 19:00, Restaurant A Porta in the center of Copenhagen. The dinner costs 400,00 Dkr and includes a three course meal and wine. Only a limited number of seats is available.

Participants interested in lunch orders and/or conference dinner participation should notify Pelle Guldborg Hansen (pgh@ruc.dk) no later than **Monday, January 26**. Only *cash* payments are accepted and no later than upon final conference registration during Thursday, January 29. *All payments should be given to Pelle Guldborg Hansen. Undue cancellation of dinner and/or lunch orders is subject to full charge. Lunch and/or dinner orders are binding.*

Location and Transportation

All presentations will take place at

The Carlsberg Academy

Gamle Carlsberg Vej 15, DK2500 Valby, in Copenhagen. See below for a map of the conference site location.



The Carlsberg Academy, Copenhagen

To reach the Carlsberg Academy at 09:00 on Thursday, January 29 and Friday, January 30 from Roskilde University, follow the schedule below:

Departure	Arrival
08:10, Trekroner St.	08:30, Valby St. ‡
08:34, Valby St.	08:38, Bjerregårdsvej ♣
08:38, Bjerregårdsvej	08:43, Carlsberg Academy ♠

‡ = Train RE 4422, Direction Østerport St.

♣ = Bus 18, Direction Nordhavn St.

♠ = Walk

To reach the Carlsberg Academy at 09:00 on Saturday, January 31 from Roskilde University, follow the schedule below:

Departure	Arrival
08:19, Trekroner St.	08:38, Valby St. ‡
08:47, Valby St.	08:50, Bjerregårdsvej ♣
08:50, Bjerregårdsvej	08:55, Carlsberg Academy ♠

‡ = Train RE 5504, Direction Østerport St.

♣ = Bus 18, Direction Nordhavn St.

♠ = Walk

To reach the Carlsberg Academy at 09:00 on Thursday, January 29 and Friday, January 30 from Copenhagen Central Station, follow the schedule below:

Departure	Arrival
08:38, Central Station.	08:42, Enghavevej. ♣
08:42, Enghavevej	08:54, Carlsberg Academy ♠

♣ = Bus, 650S Direction Avedøre St.

♠ = Walk

To reach the Carlsberg Academy at 09:00 on Saturday, January 31 from Copenhagen Central Station, follow the schedule below:

Departure	Arrival
08:43, Central Station.	08:50, De Små Haver ♣
08:50, De Små Haver	09:00, Carlsberg Academy ♠

♣ = Bus, 550S Direction Glostrup St.


♠ = Walk

For more information on transportation, refer to the DSB website (Danish Transportation Authority) and the journey planner at

http://www.dsb.dk/journey_planner/

About the Carlsberg Academy

One may find it difficult to enter the Carlsberg Academy. This is due to the fact that the Academy is located on the compound of the Carlsberg Brewery, which is a declared ‘customs free area’. Below is a map of the entrance to be used by conference participants and speakers.



© Kraks Forlag AS © D.A.V. Kortet må ikke eftergøres uden skriftlig tilladelse fra Kraks Forlag AS.

- The round dot marks the Academy, while the two squares mark the two gates at which the code ‘B 0 0 52’ should be pressed on the intercom in order to call up the conference-staff who will then let you into the compound. This have to be done each time one or more participants enter or leave, why it is obviously a good idea to come on time.
- Second, registration and payment for arrangements are due Thursday morning, January 29. Remember that payment for lunches and the conference dinner only can be made in cash and that it is a good idea to have the precise amount at hand so as to save time.

- Third, the conference dinner is planned to start at 19:00 Friday evening on Restaurant A Porta.
- Fourth, at the Carlsberg Academy everything will be served on Royal Porcelain kindly provided by the Carlsberg Academy. Because of this it is not allowed to bring coffee cups and plates into the lecture hall.
- Finally, softdrinks will be provided for free at the Academy by Carlsberg. It is however, strictly forbidden to bring these outside the Academy.

Participants

As of January 16, 2004 the list of participants include (registration for the conference is still possible).

- Alvin Goldman, Rutgers, goldman@philosophy.rutgers.edu
- Jaakko Hintikka, Boston, hintikka@bu.edu
- Jonathan Kvanvig, Missouri-Columbia, KvanvigJ@missouri.edu
- John Pollock, Arizona, pollock@arizona.edu
- Robert Stalnaker, MIT, stal@mit.edu
- Michael Williams, John Hopkins, mwilliam@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
- Timothy Williamson, Oxford, timothy.williamson@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
- Crispin Wright, St. Andrews, cjpgw@st-and.ac.uk
- Lars Gundersen, Aarhus, fillg@hum.au.dk
- Vincent F. Hendricks, Roskilde, vincent@ruc.dk
- Patrick Greenough, St. Andrews, pmg2@st-andrews.ac.uk
- Duncan Pritchard, Stirling, d.h.pritchard@stir.ac.uk
- Jakob Hohwy, Aarhus, filhohwy@hum.au.dk
- Jonas Christensen, Aarhus, namicon@yaho.dk
- Thomas Højbjerg, Aarhus, thomas_hoejbjerg@hotmail.com
- Jacob Lautrup Kristensen, Aarhus, sacrosanctus@tanke.dk
- Klemmens Kappel, Copenhagen, kappel@hum.ku.dk
- Dan Firth, St. Andrews, xtantquefx@yahoo.co.uk

- Stig Alstrup Rasmussen, Copenhagen, sar@hum.ku.dk
- Lars Binderup, Odense, binderup@filos.sdu.dk
- Mikkel Gerken, UCLA, mgerken@humnet.ucla.edu
- Nikolaj Jang Pedersen, St. Andrews, njp4@st-andrews.ac.uk
- Markus Lammenranta, Helsinki, alammenr@mappi.helsinki.fi
- Jeppe Hansen, Aarhus, pia.weedfald@adr.dk
- Fredrik Stjernberg, Växsjö, fredrik.stjernberg@hum.vxu.se
- Søren Harnow Klausen, Odense, Karin.Soren@t-online.de
- Eline Busck, St. Andrews, emb8@st-andrews.ac.uk
- Anders Schoubye, Copenhagen, schoubye@hum.ku.dk
- Nikolaj Scharling, Copenhagen, ncrs@tiscali.dk
- Jon Rostgaard Boiesen, Aarhus, jonboiesen@hotmail.com
- Jacob Birk Olsen, Copenhagen, jmbo@get2net.dk
- Andreas Lind, Lund, andreas.lind@fil.lu.se
- Adil Mawani, Kings College, adil.mawani@utoronto.ca
- Daniel Svensson, Lund, Daniel.Svensson@fil.lu.se
- Finn Guldmann, Copenhagen, finng@wiggum.ruc.dk
- Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Cambridge, steglich@hotmail.com
- Jan Alexis Nielsen, Aarhus, jan@skjoldhoej.dk
- Jørgen Villadsen, Roskilde, jv@ruc.dk
- Christian Thordal, Copenhagen, christian@thordal.com
- Morten Poulsen, Copenhagen, mortenp@lite.dk
- Mats Johansson, Lund, Mats.johansson@fil.lu.se
- Brent Madison, King's College, brent.madison@kcl.ac.uk
- Thomas Kroedel, Oxford, thomas.kroedel@merton.oxford.ac.uk
- Mario Brandhorst, Oxford, mario.brandhorst@merton.ox.ac.uk
- Jens Christian Bjerring, Copenhagen, jcbjerring@hotmail.com

- Keld Stehr Nielsen, Copenhagen, berkeley@fjong.dk
- Klaus Frovin Jørgensen, Roskilde, frovin@ruc.dk
- Jesper Kallestrup, Copenhagen, kallestrup@hum.ku.dk
- Jarl Primdal Mogensen, Odense, jarl_primdal_mogensen@hotmail.com
- Henry Frederick Meiseles, Copenhagen, meils@get2net.dk
- Martin Vinding, Roskilde, marv@ruc.dk
- Jens Kristian Mathiasen, Aarhus, jens-kristian@stofanet.dk
- Finn Collin, Copenhagen, collin@hum.ku.dk
- Jacob Busch, Aarhus
- Nikolaj Nottelman, Copenhagen, nottelman@hum.ku.dk

Publication

A contract is currently being negotiated with a prominent university publisher for the publication of the conference proceedings. The volume will be edited by Lars Gundersen and Vincent F. Hendricks and will contain all the papers given by the invited speakers. The volume is scheduled to appear in 2005.

VISIT: www.wkap.nl/prod/s/SYLI for information

Synthese Library

Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science

Editor-in-Chief:

Vincent F. Hendricks *Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark*

John Symons *University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, USA*

Honorary Editor: :

Jaakko Hintikka *Boston University, MA, USA*

Editors:

Dirk van Dalen, *University of Utrecht, The Netherlands;*

Theo A.F. Kuipers, *University of Groningen, The Netherlands;*

Teddy Seidenfeld, *Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;* **Patrick Suppes**, *Stanford University, CA, USA;*

Jan Wolenski, *Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland*

The aim of *Synthese Library* is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort is made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science.

Visit www.wkap.nl/prod/s/SYLI for information on the recent titles

Contact Information:

Charles Erkelens

Philosophy of Science and Logic E charles.erkelens@wkap.nl T +31 78 65 76 387

Floor Oosting

Philosophy and Religious Studies E floor.oosting@wkap.nl T +31 78 65 76 205



A forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology

Latest titles published:

Volume 323:

Philosophy and Logic

In Search of the Polish Tradition

Volume 322:

Knowledge Contributors

Volume 321:

Realism in Action

 **kluwer**
the language of science

MODALISM AND MENTALISM IN MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY

ΦNEWS

PRE-CONFERENCE
Roskilde University, Roskilde (DK), January 27—28, 2004

Introductory Seminar

An introductory seminar prior to the conference is scheduled for January 27–28, 2004 at Roskilde University. The seminar provides an introduction to the themes and issues to be addressed by the invited speakers during the conference. Lecturers for the seminar include Patrick Greenough, Lars Gundersen, Vincent F. Hendricks, and Duncan H. Pritchard. The pre-conference fee is 100,00 Danish kroner.

The introductory seminar prior to the conference will take place on

Tuesday, January 27 – Wednesday, January 28, 09:00-18:00
Department of Philosophy and Science Studies
Roskilde University, P6, Teorirum 6

Lecturers and Abstracts

- Patrick Greenough (St. Andrews, Scotland) / Mentalism

The aim of this talk is to survey and evaluate a number of striking themes put forward by Williamson in his recent book *Knowledge and Its Limits* (2000). Two themes are prominent: that knowledge is a state of mind and that knowledge is a basic, unanalysable, sui generis concept. We shall pay particular attention to the following Williamsonian claims: that mental states are not always accessible to the (knowing) subject, that knowledge requires a margin for error, and that only knowledge warrants assertion.

- Lars Gundersen (Aarhus, DK) / Knowledge, Dispositions and Conditionals

According to Nozick's tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows p if and only if:

(Ni) p (p is as a matter of fact the case)

(Nii) B_ap (a believes (that) p)

(Niii) $\neg p \rightarrow \neg B_ap$ (if p hadn't been the case, a would not have believed p)

(Niv) $p \rightarrow B_ap$ (if p had been the case, a would (still) have believed p)

In the paper I wish to do two things: First, I wish to argue that this theory really amounts to the idea that knowledge is best comprehended in dispositional terms—more precisely: as the manifestation of a cognitive disposition to form true beliefs. Second, I wish to uncover an interesting analogy between, on the one hand, the various sorts of so-called, 'masked', 'mimicked' and 'finkish' counterexamples to the conditional theory of dispositionality and, on the other, the various categories of counterexample to Nozick's tracking theory. Given these two findings, a threefold thesis suggests itself:

(i) That satisfaction of the two Nozickian tracking conditionals, (Niii) and (Niv), is *symptomatic* rather than constitutive of an agent's knowledge of p ,

(ii) that knowledge, rather, is constituted by the exercise of a dispositional skill to form true beliefs, and

(iii) that the attempt to capture this dispositional capability in terms of subjunctive conditionals, although providing a good approximation in a wide variety of cases, still comes apart from the real thing whenever *epistemic* masking-, mimicking- and finkish mechanisms are operating.

In the last part of the paper I will explore the prospect of a theory of knowledge and warranted beliefs based on these three insights.

- Vincent F. Hendricks (Roskilde, DK) / Forcing Epistemology

Forcing epistemology is a trendy way of defeating the skeptics who since the days of old have cited *prima facie* error-possibilities as some of the most devastating arguments against claims to knowledge. The idea of *forcing* is to delimit the set of possibilities over which the inquiring agent has to succeed: If the agent can succeed over the relevant possibility set then the agent may still be said to have knowledge even if he commits grave and many errors in other but irrelevant possibilities. Many contemporary mainstream and formal epistemologies

pay homage to the forcing strategy. The aim of this lecture is to *systematically* demonstrate that the mainstream and formal epistemologies have much in common both epistemologically and methodologically. The two approaches may profit from one another paving the way for a new unifying program in ‘interactive’ axiomatized epistemology observing both ‘active agenthood’ and computational theories of knowledge. The lecture is partly excerpts from chapters 4–8 of *Forcing Epistemology*, Vincent F. Hendricks, New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2004 (see <http://www.ruc.dk/~vincent/forcing.htm>). For background reading, download ‘Epistemology Axiomatized’, UNESCO, Paris, November 2003, at <http://www.ruc.dk/~vincent/epiaxiom.pdf>.

- Duncan H. Pritchard (Stirling, UK) / Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres

Attributer contextualists maintain that the verb ‘knows’ is context-sensitive in the sense that the truth conditions of a sentence of the form ‘*S* knows that *p*’ can be dependent upon the ascriber’s context. One natural objection against attributer contextualism is that it confuses the impropriety of assertions which ascribe knowledge to agents with the falsity of those assertions. In an influential article, Keith DeRose has defended attributer contextualism against this charge by proposing constraints on what he calls ‘warranted assertibility manoeuvres’ of this sort. This paper argues that, contra DeRose, the warranted assertibility manuvre directed at attributer contextualism is able to meet the constraints that DeRose lays down.

Program Committee / Organizers

Program Committee

- Lars Gundersen / Aarhus University / fillg@hum.au.dk
- Vincent F. Hendricks / Roskilde University / vincent@ruc.dk

Organizers

- Lars Gundersen / Aarhus University / fillg@hum.au.dk
- Vincent F. Hendricks / Roskilde University / vincent@ruc.dk
- Pelle Guldberg Hansen / Roskilde University / pgh@ruc.dk
- Jonas Christensen / Aarhus University / namicon@au.dk

Program

Tuesday, Jan. 27

09:00 - 09:20	Registration
09:20 - 09:30	Opening
09:30 - 10:30	L. Gundersen
10:30 - 11:00	Discussion
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee
11:30 - 12:30	D. Pritchard
12:30 - 13:00	Discussion
13:00 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:00	P. Greenough
15:00 - 15:30	Discussion
15:30 - 16:30	V.F. Hendricks
16:30 - 17:00	Discussion / Coffee
18:00 -	Dinner

Wednesday, Jan. 28

09:30 - 10:30	D. Pritchard
10:30 - 11:00	Discussion
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee
11:30 - 12:30	L. Gundersen
12:30 - 13:00	Discussion
13:00 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:00	V.F. Hendricks
15:00 - 15:30	Discussion
15:30 - 16:00	Coffee
16:00 - 17:00	P. Greenough
17:00 - 17:30	Discussion / Coffee

Lunch and Dinner Arrangements

A seminar dinner is arranged for all the attendees of the introductory seminar on **Tuesday, January 27**. The dinner will take place at 18:00 in the lunch room of the Department of Philosophy and Science Studies. To sign up for the seminar dinner, contact Pelle Guldborg Hansen (pgh@ruc.dk).

Lunch during the seminar may be obtained from the Roskilde University cantina.


Location

The pre-conference will take place at the Department of Philosophy and Science Studies. See map below—the Department of Philosophy and Science Studies is ‘boxed’.

Participants

As of January 16, 2004 the list of participants include (registration for the pre-conference is still possible):

- Duncan Pritchard, Stirling, d.h.pritchard@stir.ac.uk
- Vincent F. Hendricks, Roskilde, vincent@ruc.dk
- Lars Gundersen, Aarhus, fillg@hum.au.dk
- Patrick Greenough, St. Andrews, pmg2@st-andrews.ac.uk
- Morten Poulsen, Copenhagen, mortenp@lite.dk
- Jonas Christensen, Aarhus, namicon@yahoohk
- Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Cambridge, steglich@hotmail.com
- Brent Madison, King’s College, brent.madison@kcl.ac.uk
- Adil Mawani, Kings College, adil.mawani@utoronto.ca
- Eline Busck, St. Andrews, emb8@st-andrews.ac.uk
- Anders Schoubye, Copenhagen, schoubye@hum.ku.dk
- Nikolaj Scharling, Copenhagen, ncrs@tiscali.dk
- Keld Stehr Nielsen, Copenhagen, berkeley@fjong.dk
- Jesper Kallestrup, Copenhagen, kallestrup@hum.ku.dk
- Pelle Guldborg Hansen, Roskilde, pgh@ruc.dk
- Stig Alstrup Rasmussen, Copenhagen, sar@hum.ku.dk
- Jeppe Hansen, Aarhus, pia.weedfald@adr.dk
- Jens Christian Bjerring, Copenhagen, jcbjerring@hotmail.com
- Jarl Primdal Mogensen, Odense, jarl_primdal_mogensen@hotmail.com



Accommodations

The Department of Philosophy and Science Studies is prepared to house as many as 30 students during the conference and introductory seminar. However it is of immanent importance that students who wish to take advantage of this opportunity register as early as possible, and inform of their intentions to take up the offer, in order for the organizers to arrange for these accommodations. Please contact Pelle Guldborg Hansen (pgh@ruc.dk) for more information. The fee for accommodations is 200,00 Danish kroner for the entire duration of the event (conference and pre-conference). The participants staying at the Department should attempt to come on Monday, January 26 before 16:00. The department has beds, bath and kitchen facilities.

Travel Grants for PhD-students

NAMICONA / PHIS has a limited number of travel grants available for overseas

ph.d.-students who wish to attend the conference. In order to apply for one of these, please send a short application (including name, affiliation and research interests) and a CV to:

NAMICONA
Department of Philosophy
Aarhus University
DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Fax: (+45) 8942-2223
Mail: namicona@au.dk

Deadline for application is **January 10, 2004**.

8 BRIDGES BETWEEN MAINSTREAM AND FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Edited by

VINCENT F. HENDRICKS

Special issue of

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES – *An International Journal for Philosophy in the
Analytic Tradition*

Forthcoming 2005

Contemporary epistemologists are roughly divided into two sorts; those relying largely on common-sense considerations and focusing on examples and counterexamples for advancing or rejecting various epistemological theses, and those applying a variety of tools and methods from logic, computability theory or probability theory to the theory of knowledge. The two sorts, and the traditions to which they hitherto are taken to belong, have unfortunately proceeded largely in isolation from one another. But on closer examination the approaches have much in common, may be bridged for their mutual benefit and the advancement of epistemology in general. Here are 8 ways of doing it as the invited papers in this special issue of *Philosophical Studies* demonstrate the fruitful interaction between informal considerations and various formal apparatus in order to support, sharpen, undermine, realize, or contribute in some other pertinent way to fundamental epistemological themes.

8 Bridges Between Mainstream and Formal Epistemology offers contributions from:

- Horacio Arló-Costa (Carnegie Mellon University)
- Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam / Stanford University)
- Luc Bovens (University of Colorado at Boulder)
- Stephan Hartmann (London School of Economics)
- Heinrich Wansing (Technical University of Dresden)
- ... and more to be announced

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES is published by Kluwer Academic Publishers

<http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0031-8116>

The Free Newsletter for Philosophical Logic and Its Applications

Φ NEWS is the freely distributed newsletter associated with Φ LOG and has much the same aims:

- To consolidate philosophical logic as an interdisciplinary activity
- To report on, and hopefully aid the coordination of, the research activities, conference activities and publications in philosophical logic, its applications and neighboring disciplines
- To shape and sharpen the general interest in philosophical logic and communicate important results and break-throughs in the field to a less specialized audience

Φ NEWS is edited by Vincent F. Hendricks, Stig Andur Pedersen and Dov M. Gabbay. The newsletter is published by Φ LOG and Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Submissions

Φ NEWS publishes contributions in terms of

- Extensive expositional papers
- Announcements
- New initiatives

Extensive Expositional Papers

Φ NEWS invites authors to submit extensive expositional papers (30-50 pages) on philosophical logic (including inductive logic, alethic logic, temporal logic, epistemic logic, deontic logic, conditional logic ... with a special focus on multi-modal logics) and its relations to notably epistemology, methodology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind ... and its applications in computer science, information theory, cognitive science, mathematics, linguistics, economics and game

theory ... These lists are not exhaustive. The papers should be expositional in nature rather than detailed technical accounts or analyses. Observe that Φ NEWS only publishes a limited number of papers a volume.

Announcements

Φ NEWS publishes announcements of

- upcoming workshops, seminars and conferences
- forthcoming publications

Be sure to provide as detailed information as possible including the title of the event, time and place, contact information, website address and an abstract/description of the event or publication.

New Initiatives

Φ NEWS attempts to keep track of new initiatives pertinent to philosophical logic and its applications such as new networks, societies, foundations, bulletin boards, journals etc. To place an add for a new initiative in the newsletter contact the Φ NEWS editors.

Φ NEWS, volume 5 is scheduled for April 2004. Deadline for submissions is March 1, 2004.

Format

Φ NEWS encourages contributors to format their submissions according to the following guidelines: Contributors are asked to state their name, affiliation and contact information on a cover sheet together with information on the nature of the contribution. Contributions should preferably be written in $\text{T}_{\text{E}}\text{X}$, $\text{L}^{\text{A}}\text{T}_{\text{E}}\text{X}$ or $\text{L}^{\text{A}}\text{T}_{\text{E}}\text{X}_{\epsilon}$ but other word processing packages are accepted provided that the contributions are saved in rich text format (RTF) with a minimum of formatting (remember to state your system platform). If either $\text{T}_{\text{E}}\text{X}$, $\text{L}^{\text{A}}\text{T}_{\text{E}}\text{X}$ or $\text{L}^{\text{A}}\text{T}_{\text{E}}\text{X}_{\epsilon}$ is used contributors are instructed to include all special packages and macros used to generate the document. In addition to hard-copy printouts of figures, contributors are requested to supply the electronic versions of figures in either Encapsulated PostScript (EPS), TIFF format, GIF format or JPG format.

- References to books should follow the citation format: Glymour, C. (1992). *Thinking Things Through*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
- References to articles should follow the citation format: Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive Knowledge, *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 74(1996): 549-67

- References to articles in conference proceedings should follow the citation format: Halpern, J.Y. and Vardi, M. Y. (1988). The Complexity of Reasoning about Knowledge and Time, in *Proc. 20th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing*: 53-65

Submissions should be sent to the Φ NEWS editors either electronically or by regular mail to the address stated on the inner sleeve of this newsletter. The contribution should be accompanied with a cover letter stating full address for correspondence, including telephone and fax number and e-mail address. Proofs will be sent to the corresponding contributor electronically in PS or PDF format. The corresponding contributor is kindly requested to return one corrected hard-copy of the manuscript inside 2 weeks of receipt. Deadline for submissions for Φ NEWS volume 5 is March 1, 2004.

Free Subscription

Subscription to Φ NEWS is free. Please write the editors to obtain your free subscription to the newsletter. Be sure to include the following information:

- Name
- Position
- Affiliation
- Mailing address
- Email
- A short description of your interest in philosophical logic